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NOTES
DEFINING TENDER OFFERS: RESOLVING
A DECADE OF DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION
In November 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC or Commission) proposed a rule that defines the term
"tender offer."' In making the proposal, the SEC sought to make it
clear that coverage of the provisions of the federal securities laws
governing cash takeover bids2 extends beyond "conventional"
tender offers. Traditionally, a tender offer has been described as an
invitation to all shareholders of a specified publicly held corpora-
tion to sell a fixed amount of the company's stock at a price above
that prevailing in the market place.' Unregulated by the securities
laws as originally drafted, abuses surged concomitantly with the
popularity4 of tender offers as corporate takeover devices.5 In re-
I See Exchange Act Release No. 16,385 (Dec. 6, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349.
2 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1976).
See, e.g., 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS 106 (1978); Note,
The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Developing Meaning]. Most com-
monly, the conventional tender offer reached the shareholders of the target corporation by
means of newspaper advertisements. See Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids:
Gap In Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 499, 502 (1967). Large scale
mailings, intermediaries, and other impersonal methods, however, also were utilized. See 2
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 6.1, at 107 (Supp. 1977). The offering price was
approximately 20% above the market price. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Take-
over Bids-For Bidders, Incumbent Managements, and Shareholders, 45 HARV. Bus. REV.
135, 141 (1967). Although the price was fixed, competing offers and shareholder resistance
often served to increase the premium. See 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW : FRAUD § 6.1, at
109 (Supp. 1969). A stated time until which the offer would remain open was contained in
every bid. See Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REV. 377, 378 (1969). Where the
offeror did not receive the amount of shares he requested within the period designated in
the offer, he could merely extend the duration of the offer. See, e.g., Electronic Specialty Co.
v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 943 (2d Cir. 1969).
' Widespread use of the tender offer began occurring in the mid 1960's, an era charac-
terized by rising corporate liquidity, easily attainable credit, and a growing amount of re-
spect attributed to cash offers. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids - For
Bidders, Incumbent Managements, and Shareholders, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 135, 136 (1967).
The factor most directly responsible for the swell in the number of cash tender offers was
the presence of rigid pre-acquisition filing requirements affixed to the traditional takeover
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sponse, Congress enacted the Williams Act' (the Act) in 1968 to
or merger when accomplished through a proxy contest, see notes 13-15 infra, or an exchange
offer, and the absence of any in the case of the cash tender offer. The number of tender
offers has ballooned in recent years. Between 1956 and 1960, only 83 takeover bids were
initiated. See Hayes & Taussig, supra, at 137. Shortly thereafter, the tender offer began its
development, as evidenced by the 155 bids attempted from 1964 through 1966. Id. In 1966
alone, there were more than 100 such attempts as contrasted with only eight made in 1960.
See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2811, 2812 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP., U.S. NEws]. In keeping with this boom, the
tender offer was employed as an interfirm takeover vehicle a total of 313 times in 1976 and
1977. See Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers,
N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1978, at 25, col. 3. The success rate of effecting a takeover by tender offer
has remained constant at approximately 80% between 1956 and 1977. Id. One commentator
has argued that because the takeover wave is healthy to both the market and the economy,
it is likely to continue into the future. See generally, Ehrbar, Corporate Takeovers Are
Here to Stay, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 91, 100.
The tender offer has also experienced substantial growth in the methods, of its use.
Throughout the early 1960's, tender offers were utilized chiefly in situations where the of-
feror and the target's management were on friendly terms. See Fleischer & Mundheim, Cor-
porate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 318 (1967). Under these non-
contested circumstances, the tender offer was found to be more advantageous than the
customary asset acquisition primarily because it was cheaper. Id. The tender offer was also
commonly employed by an issuer attempting to repurchase its own shares, see D. AUSTIN &
J. FISHMAN, CORPORATIONS IN CONFLIT-THE TENDER OFFER 7 (1970), and by a controlling
shareholder desirous of enlarging his block. See, e.g., FMC Corp. Plans to Acquire Raygo,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1972, at 67, col. 4.
The recent trend, however, has been to use tender offers for four other purposes: to
obtain control of a corporation that is adverse to being taken over, to acquire a company
whose board of directors, although unopposed, is not in favor of sponsoring the acquisition,
to gain control of a corporation before a competing bid is perfected by a third party, and to
save a company in danger where a timely merger could not be made. See M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, supra note 3, at 3.
6 When the tender offer is employed as a device to raid a corporation, the raider gener-
ally looks for seven features in finding a target company. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
supra note 3, at 9-10. These characteristics include "low price-earnings ratio and high book
value in relation to market price;" "a business that it knows and understands;" "no concen-
trated blocks in inside hands;" "no antitrust or other regulatory problems;" "no state take-
over statute impediments;" "insiders with a low tax basis for their shares who may be recep-
tive to conversion of a cash tender offer to a complete 6r partial tax-free merger or an
installment sale purchase of their shares prior to or after a cash tender offer;" and a man-
agement that probably will not fight too hard. Id.
6 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, .(amending 15 U.S.C. §§78m-n
(1964)) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1976)); see notes 28-40 and ac-
companying text infra.
Although tender offers were not subject to federal regulation prior to the Williams Act,
the forms used were controlled to some degree by the rules of the New York Stock Ex-
change. See Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Reg-
ulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 499, 503 (1967). The American Stock Exchange also made
certain recommendations available to those dealing with companies whose securities were
listed on its exchange. Id. at 503 n.14. Further evidencing a lack of control over tender offers
was that none of the remaining eleven American exchanges nor the National Association of
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compel complete disclosure by tender offerors to permit the share-
holders of target corporations to make informed judgments. In pro-
viding for the regulation of tender offers, the legislation failed to
specify the term's meaning. As a result, the courts and the SEC
have attempted to evolve a definition on a case-by-case basis, but
no single construction of the term has achieved universal
application.7
This Note will examine the development of the meaning of the
term "tender offer" from passage of the Williams Act to the pre-
sent. To this end, the Note will start with a discussion of events
leading to passage of the Williams Act and of the provisions of the
Act.8 An analysis of judicial and administrative attempts at defini-
tions will follow.9 Finally, the Note will explain the definition that
the SEC has proposed to adopt as a rule and evaluate its merit in
light of the Act's legislative and judicial history.10
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING TENDER OFFERS
The Need for Legislation
During the mid 1960's, tender offers, which traditionally had
been employed by corporations wishing to repurchase their own se-
curities," came into increasing use as corporate takeover devices.' 2
Unlike conventional means of effecting takeovers such as mergers,
exchange offers, and proxy contests, tender offers were unregu-
lated.' 3 As a result, tender offers were the fastest method of acquir-
Securities Dealers, Inc. had promulgated any rules governing the form that cash tender of-
fers took. Id. at 503-04.
See notes 41-112 and accompanying text infra.
8 See notes 11-40 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 41-112 and accompanying text infra.
'0 See notes 113-156 and accompanying text infra.
" See Fleck, Corporate Share Repurchasing: An Informal Discussion, HARV. Bus. S.
BULL., Jan.-Feb. 1965, at 10; Zilber, Corporate Tender Offers for Their Own Stock: Some
Legal and Financial Considerations, 33 U. CINc. L. REV. 315 (1964). The use of the cash
takeover bid by corporations as a method of repurchasing their own stocks continued be-
yond the 1960's. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1973, at 46, col. 4 (cash tender offer by Gulf
Oil Corp. to repurchase its own common stock).
"z See note 4 supra. The corporate combination boom of the mid 1960's summoned
application of the tender offer as a takeover device. See Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate
Acquisition By Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 318 (1967). Previously, takeovers and
combinations were effectuated almost exclusively through mergers, consolidations, and asset
acquisitions. See Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques in Corporate Acquisitions,
70 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1184-85 (1957).
'3 When confronted with a hostile management, the raider's choices are narrowed to a
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ing control. 4 They also tended to be less expensive than proxy
contests, and the consequences to the tender offeror for failing to
succeed in obtaining the desired control over the target company
tended not to be as severe. 15 Perhaps the most beneficial character-
istics to the offeror were its elements of secrecy and surprise. 6
Where the offeror's identity was concealed, the target company
would be almost powerless to present convincing reasons to share-
holders for not selling their securities at prices that were consider-
tender offer, an exchange offer, or a proxy contest, since the asset acquisition or merger
requires the endorsement of the target's management. See Fleischer & Mundheim, Corpo-
rate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 320 (1967).
Acquiring control through a proxy contest requires compliance with § 14 (a)-(c) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1976), and the rules promulgated thereunder, SEC Regula-
tions 14A & 14C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a & 240.14c (1979). For a scholarly discussion of the use
of proxy contests and the laws governing them, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CON-
TESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (2d ed. 1968).
An exchange offer is made when a corporation makes an offer to shareholders of an-
other corporation to exchange the shares of the offering corporation for the individuals'
shares. Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 3, at 501. Such an offer mandates compliance with
certain registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976). Addi-
tionally, the exchange offer was subject to various state "blue sky" laws, see LIPTON &
STEINBERGER, supra note 3, at 3, while prior to 1968, cash takeover bids generally eluded
state regulation.
Former SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen explained the inadequacy of the lack of federal
regulations governing cash takeovers by analogizing to exchange offers. See Cohen, A Note
On Takeover Bids And Corporate Purchases Of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149, 150 (1966). He
observed that "[tihe investment decision is similar-the choice whether to retain the origi-
nal security or sell it is, in substance, little different from the decision made on an original
purchase of a security, or an offer to exchange one security for another." Id. Accordingly,
exchange offers are now regulated with tender offers under 14(e) of the 1934 Act. See notes
37-40 infra.
" See Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L. REv. 377, 379 (1969).
" One study disclosed that conducting a proxy contest was more than three times as
expensive as making a tender offer. See Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1966, at 1, col. 6. That estimate,
however, excluded from the cost of the tender offer, the huge expense of purchasing the
target's shares, construing that outlay to be an investment rather than an expenditure. Id.
Viewed in that manner, even if the takeover bid proved unsuccessful, the raider was left in a
position to make earnings from market sales of its acquired shares or to be bought out by a
management, unpleased with its holdings. See Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisi-
tion by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 321 (1967).
10 See Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 3, at 500-01; Comment, Tender Offers, Creeping
Acquisitions and the Williams Act, 2 CUM.-SAM. L. RE V. 402, 403 (1971). Absolute secrecy
was a valuable asset to the raider because it limited the factors influencing a shareholder's
decision to the premium price. See Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate
Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAw. 149, 151 (1966). Similarly, the element of surprise renders
the raider more effective. Without warning, an unfriendly management cannot utilize nu-
merous defensive tactics which might otherwise be employed to defeat the bid. See Hayes &
Taussig, supra note 3, at 139.
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ably higher than market prices.'" Moreover, shareholders were
pressured to make hurried judgments because of the time limita-
tions of the offers.' 8 Ultimately, the cash tender offer became the
most successful and popular means of acquiring control over
corporations.'"
Lacking adequate information about the persons or entities
making tender offers, shareholders solicited in cash takeover bids
became subject to several risks over which they had no control. If a
shareholder rejected an offer, for example, his interest in the target
company could become subject to the management of a successful
unknown raider. 20 Another risk was that a shareholder who ten-
dered his stock might be able to sell only a portion of it, since most
tender offers seek only a limited number of shares.2 ' In this event,
the remaining shares would be subject to the control of the
" Management's ability to combat a known offer can be as awesome, in many ways, as
the capacity of the raider acting against a naive management. Management has at its dispo-
sal the corporate financial resources to resist a tender offer. See Fleischer & Mundheim,
Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 321 (1967). With access to
the corporate treasury, management is equipped to commence litigation by claiming anti-
trust, margin regulation, conflict of interests, or Williams Act violations. See M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, supra note 3, at 70, 71. It might, however, choose to urge its shareholders not
to tender. Id. at 71. If this route is selected, management will be aided by shareholder lists
and by knowing which shareholders own large blocks. The target could also raise its divi-
dends, split its stock, liquidate at a price greater than the price of the bid, or attempt to
purchase its own shares at a premium above the raider's offering price. Id. Additionally, the
target may have "allies" such as banks and insurance companies who will refrain from
financing the takeover attempt. See Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by
Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 322 (1967). Another technique that can be used by a
hostile management is to seek out a "White Knight," a friendly corporation willing to make
a competing offer. See M. LIPTON & E. STEIN ERGER, supra note 3, at 71. For an exhaustive
analysis of the options available to management, see Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979); Note, Defensive Tactics
Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104
(1969).
11 Although it has been contended that price is the only factor evaluated by sharehold-
ers when considering whether to sell, it has been argued that this statement must be consid-
ered in light of the bidder's intentions before an informed decision can be made. See Cohen,
A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149, 151 (1966).
For example, assume a bidder is confident that liquidating the target will realize him an
amount per share three times the value of the stock's current market price. While an offer-
ing price of 20% above market might ordinarily seem quite attractive, it is questionable
whether the raider would be able to get away so cheaply if the shareholders knew of any
liquidation plans or changes in operating procedures or investment decisions. Id.
'9 See note 4 supra.
20 See H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in U.S. NEws at 2812.
21 Fleisher & Mundheim, supra note 4, at 336 & n.76.
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raider.2 2 Without knowledge about the acquirer, the shareholder
assumed the risk of his investment turning sour under new man-
agement. These risks attached at the moment the tender offer be-
gan, because shareholders who accepted offers were required, as
they are today, to relinquish their shares to a designated deposi-
tory. Finally, shareholders with small amounts of stock often ten-
dered their shares as early as possible because of the prospect of
being closed out of an offer,24 whereas those owning enough shares
to have a crucial effect on the outcome of the offer could withhold
their acceptances until a higher price were offered.25
Notwithstanding the risks inherent in unregulated tender of-
fers, judicial attempts to bring such offers within the ambit of the
existing securities laws proved fruitless. Since knowledge of one's
own intentions usually does not amount to inside information, the
mere withholding of such information by an offeror was not fraud-
ulent and thus not violative of rule 10b-5.26 Although rule 10b-5
might have governed a takeover bid by an offeror having a duty to
disclose inside information, 27 the great majority of tender offers re-
22 See H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in U.S. NEWS at 2812.
23 The function of the depository, which invariably is a bank, is to receive the tendered
shares and pay for them on behalf of the offeror. Prior to passage of the withdrawal provi-
sions of the Williams Act, § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)(1976), the shareholder was with-
out power to retake them. See Developing Meaning, supra note 3, at 1252 n. 14. This de-
prived the investor of control over his securities, a power which he retained in privately
negotiated transactions or dealings in the open market until the sales were consummated.
See Developing Meaning, supra note 3, at 1252. While it is arguable that this was a risk
known to investors, it nevertheless placed shareholders on far less than equal footing with
the offeror, whose obligation to purchase any shares was almost always conditioned upon the
tendering of a minimum number of shares. Such an amount was invariably fixed by the
offeror at a point which would guarantee him control of the target company. Setting a high
minimum may also result in discouraging arbitrage. See generally, Rubin, Arbitrage, 32
Bus. LAW. 1315 (1977).
24 See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 4, at 346, 350.
25 In some instances, the terms of the tender offer were preliminarily negotiated with
major shareholders, thereby creating further discrimination against the small investor. See,
e.g., Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 757 (D.N.J. 1955).
26 SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(c) (1979). Rule 10b-5 renders illegal any fraudu-
lent conduct "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Id. Because the rule
is triggered only when there is a duty to disclose, Chiarella v. U.S., 48 U.S.L.W. 4250 (March
18, 1980), and since such a duty arises predominantly when there exists a fiduciary relation-
ship between the parties to the transaction, the weakness in the argument that all tender
offers are covered by the provision is clear. See Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F.Supp. 49, 59
(N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
27 It was suggested that a raider could attain "insider" status if, while engaged in a
program of market purchases prior to the making of a tender offer, it learned publicly un-
disclosed material information about the target through discussions with incumbent man-
1980]
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mained unregulated, and the need for legislation became clear.
The Williams Act
Recognizing the need to extend the coverage of the securities
laws to tender offers, Congress considered amendments to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) in 1968.28 In defending
the legislation of which he was sponsor, Senator Harrison Williams
claimed that the bill was intended both to correct the existing im-
blance between the regulatory burdens placed on the target com-
panies and those placed on offerors and to afford investors much-
needed protections.2 9 Senator Williams' bill ultimately became law,
agement. See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 4, at 332. The authors noted, however,
that such a classification was strained at best. Id. at 331.
Moreover, courts denied standing to target companies and their non-tendering share-
holders in lob-5 suits since neither class could be construed to be purchasers or sellers, a
threshold requirement in such an action. See, e.g., Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. D. Kalt-
man & Co., 283 F. Supp. 763, 764-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Schoenbaun v. Firstbrook, 268 F.
Supp. 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
21 When Senator Williams initially introduced a bill to regulate cash tender offers, S.
2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), the SEC made recommendations which would promote a
more neutral policy, believing that Senator Williams' measure would give management un-
warranted advantages. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the
Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, on S. 2731, 112 CoNG. REc. 19,003-06
(1966).
29 See 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967). Since it was feared that Senator Williams' previous
measure, S. 2731, see note 28 supra, was too harsh on takeover attempts, the Senator was
quick to observe, upon introduction of S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), that the revision
guarded all of the legitimate interests of the target, its management, and its shareholders
"without unduly impeding cash takeover bids." Id. One restraint that the revised bill placed
on management was a grant of rulemaking power to the SEC regarding the statements that
management could make to shareholders on how to act on the offer. Id. at 855-56.
Despite this attempt at a balancing approach, the Supreme Court has declared that the
offerors were not "intended beneficiaries" of the legislation. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977).
In elucidating that the essential purpose of the proposed legislation is to demand full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of shareholders, the bill's co-sponsor, Senator Thomas
Kuchel, depicted the very situation he hoped enactment of S. 510 would prevent:
Today, there are those individuals in our financial community who seek to reduce
our proudest businesses into nothing but corporate shells. They seize control of
the corporation with unknown sources, sell or trade away the best assets, and later
split up the remains among themselves. The tragedy of such collusion is that the
corporation can be financially raped without management or shareholders having
any knowledge of the acquisitions.
113 Cong. Rec. 854, 857-58 (1967). Referring to bidders as "takeover pirates," id. at 858,
Senator Kuchel suggested that the threats posed by these "pirates" were more dangerous
than the underhandedness that culminated in the crash of 1927. Id. at 857-58.
In the same spirit, SEC Chairman Cohen stressed the importance of providing adequate
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and tender offers now are regulated by sections 14(d) and 14(e) of
the 1934 Act.30
In its present form, section 14(d) requires a tender offeror to
disclose certain information to the SEC at the start of the offer if
its successful consummation would result in ownership of more
than five percent of any class of the target company's equity secur-
ities.3 1 Any person to whom this provision applies must file a state-
communication with shareholders and the need to insure them sufficient time to arrive at a
sound investment decision. Only in this manner, the SEC chief explained, could undue pres-
sure on offerees during a takeover bid be avoided. See Hearings on S. 510 Before Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
1o The five new sections added by the Williams Act to the 1934 Act are § 13(d), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976) (requiring any "person" attaining "beneficial ownership" of 5% of a
class of registered equity securities to file within 10 days specified information with the
issuer, the SEC, and every exchange where the security is traded); § 13(e), 15 ,U.S.C. §
78m(e) (1976) (affording SEC power to regulate corporate stock repurchases); § 14(d) 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976) (governing preacquisition disclosure where tender offer would result
in bidder's owning more than 5% of a class of securities, withdrawal rights of offeree, prora-
tion in offers for less than all of the target's shares, and increased prices to be paid to
shareholders tendering early); § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (prohibiting fraud in the
making of any tender offer); and § 14(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1976) (requiring disclosure
where a change of majority of the Board of Directors would occur subsequent to takeover).
31 The 1934 Act, § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). Section 14(d)(1) provides, in
pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to make a tender offer for, or a request or
invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity security ... if, after consumma-
tion thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of
more than 5 per centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer or
request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders such
person has filed with the Commission a statement containing such of the informa-
tion specified in section 78m (d) of this title ....
As originally enacted, § 14(d)(1) required 10% beneficial ownership before disclosure was
mandated; this was lowered to 5% in 1970. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567,§ 3, 84
Stat. 1497.
Specifically exempted by § 14(d)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8) (1976), from preacquisition
disclosure, are acquisitions that would not amount to more than 2% of a class when com-
bined with all other acquisitions of that class made within the past year. Also excluded are
offers made by the issuer of the security solicited, and those which the Commission deems
do not fall within the class of activities designed to be regulated by Congress. Id. Presuma-
bly, these exclusions were incorporated into the legislation because they are not among the
type of transactions that will result in a substantial transformation of the target or that will
pressure a shareholder into making an uninformed decision to sell. See H. R. REP. supra
note 4, at 8-9, reprinted in U.S. NEws at 2813; 113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967) (remarks of
Senator Williams).
The question whether "beneficial ownership" exists is governed by rule 13d-3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-3 (1979).
By virtue of § 13(d)(3), persons acting as a group to acquire, retain or sell securities are
deemed a "person" for Williams Act filing purposes. For a detailed discussion of this issue,
see M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 3, at 96-105.
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ment with the SEC revealing, inter alia, his identity and back-
ground; the source of funds to be used for purchases; the number
of shares he holds in the target company; any arrangements he has
made involving the target company's stock; and any major changes
he contemplates in the company's corporate structure if control of
the target is desired.2 The offeror also is required to file copies of
all materials used to solicit shares in the target company and to
furnish the target company with a copy of all filed information.3
Apparently fearful that the disclosure requirements might not
resolve all potential inequities in cash takeover bids, Congress en-
acted several additional provisions that regulate the manner in
which tender offers may be carried out. For example, investors who
accept an offer are permitted to withdraw their shares during the
first 15 days and after the first 60 days of the offer.3 4 Additionally,
where an offeror seeks fewer than all the outstanding shares in the
target company, the shares tendered must be purchased on a pro
rata basis.35 Finally, where an offeror raises the purchase price
32 The 1934 Act, § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976). The information required of the
purchaser is set forth in § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(d)(1) (1976). The mere preparation of
such a massive document, it was observed, "may delay or even compromise the secrecy of
the tender offer itself." Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection With Cash Take-Over
Bids: The New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAW. 19, 25 (1968). Additionally, § 14(d)(1) prescribes
that the SEC may require the disclosure of whatever additional information it deems neces-
sary to effectuate the underlying policy considerations of the Act. Accordingly, the SEC has
promulgated a more exhaustive list of disclosure requirements in Schedule 14D, which was
devised pursuant to its adoption of rule 14d-1 of Regulation 14D, rule 14d-l(a)-(g), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1979).
3 The 1934 Act, § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d) (1976).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976); Rule 14d-7 (a)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 70,334 (1979). Section
14d(5) is designed to present investors with a "short period within which to reconsider",
H.R.REP., supra note 4, at 10, reprinted in U.S.NEws at 2820, and to "prevent tendered
securities from being tied up indefinitely .... " Id. A shareholder who has tendered his
shares may wish to reconsider upon a showing by management that the offering price is
really inadequate. See Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REv. 377, 385 (1969). During
consideration of the bill, the SEC opted for withdrawal to be permitted up until the time
that the securities were purchased, thereby allowing offerees to participate in counteroffers.
Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 210-212. The New York Stock Exchange opposed such a
one-sided approach, favoring a 7-day provision, which was adopted in the legislation. Id. at
92 (statement of New York Stock Exchange). Recent action by the Commission extended
the withdrawal period from 7 to 15 days, rule 14d-7(a)(1), and established additional with-
drawal rights applicable to a situation with competing tender offers. Id. (a)(2).
"5 The 1934 Act, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1975). Only shares tendered during
the first 10 days of the offer or within 10 days of an increase in the offering price must be
purchased pro rata. Id. In response to some confusion among the authorities on whether §
14(d)(6) is violated when the offeror provides pro rata periods in excess of those made
mandatory by the statute, see Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 77 (testimony of Donald
Calvin); id. at 186-88 & 190 (testimony of Manuel Cohen, Chairman, SEC), the Commission
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while the offer is pending, all tendering shareholders must be given
the benefit of the price increase.36 Adding to these provisions, the
SEC recently promulgated a rule requiring tender offers to remain
open for at least 20 days3 7 in an effort to discourage a raider from
attempting a quick takeover, sometimes referred to as a "Saturday
night special" or "blitzkrieg."' 8
In addition to its disclosure requirements and substantive pro-
visions, the Williams Act contains its own antifraud section.
Modeled after rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act, section 14(e) makes it
unlawful for anyone "to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer
... ,,9 Like rule 10b-5, the provision has been interpreted to pro-
hibit false statements and omissions of material facts in connection
with any tender offer.40
has recently adopted a specific exemption from the statutory pro rata requirements. See
rule 14d-8, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384 (Dec. 6, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,335. The
Commission believes that § 14(d)(6) establishes only minimum proration standards and
that, assuming full compliance with the provision, the bidder should not be precluded from
extending the pro rata periods. Id.
The Commission has also responded to another related problem that led to mjust re-
sults. The practice of tendering short, whereby the shareholder guarantees a fixed number
of shares to the depository and in actuality, does not own that many shares, has been out-
lawed by rule 10b-4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1979). The inequity inherent in tendering short
is made visible by the proration provision, § 14(d) (6), which is computed by totaling the
shares promised rather than the shares actually owned. Thus, a shareholder who tenders
short may unfairly have bought all of the shares which he actually owns.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976). By requiring the offeror to pay the increased price to
those who tendered early, regardless whether any shares were actually purchased prior to
the raised consideration, the legislation assures "equality of treatment among all sharehold-
ers who tender their shares." H. R. REP., supra note 4, at 11, reprinted in U. S. NEws at
2821.
'7 Rule 14e-l(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,336 (1979).
" Saturday night specials are unfriendly tender offers which involve no discussions
with the respective target prior to the announcement of the takeover bid. Because they
generally remain open for minimum periods, they are calculated to place incumbent man-
agement in a highly pressured situation. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 3, at
39. Other tender offer approaches include the strong bear hug, where the offeror informs the
target of its intentions and negotiates for its support while simultaneously announcing pub-
licly its plans to make a tender offer; the bear hug, where the raider merely tells the target
about a proposed takeover bid including the fixed terms of the offer; the cash option merger,
where the raider offers stockholders their choice of taxable cash consideration or an ex-
change of stock, which is tax free; the installment sale, which offers the same tax advantage,
where shareholders can accept an installment note rather than cash; and the casual pass,
where, in a friendly takeover attempt, the raider notifies the target that it is contemplating
a tender offer but that it is willing to negotiate. Id. at 40-56.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
40 Section 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), applies even to tender offers exempted from
the preacquisition disclosure requirements of § 14(d)(1). See Henry Heide, Inc., [1972-1973
1980]
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WHAT CONSTITUTES A TENDER OFFER?
Development of the law
While the Williams Act generally has proven effective in the
regulation of tender offers,41 it is not always clear whether a partic-
ular transaction comes within its coverage. Although the Williams
Act clearly was intended to regulate conventional tender offers, 2
the extent, if any, to which it was intended to reach transactions
resembling conventional offers in substance but differing in form,
remains unclear.4" It has been suggested that since the legislative
history contains references only to conventional offers, Congress
may have intended that the relevant provisions of the Act be simi-
larly limited in scope.04 Indeed, this proposition appears to be sup-
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 78,838, at 81,836 (SEC staff letter).
The right to a private cause of action is not expressly granted in the Williams Act.
Shortly after its enactment, however, courts began to imply such a right. See Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp. 409 F.2d 937, 945-46 (2d Cir. 1969). In Elec-
tronic Specialty Co., the court held that both the target company and non-tendering share-
holders have standing to sue under §14(e). More recently, the Supreme Court has held that
an unsuccessful tender offeror does not have standing to sue for damages under §14(e).
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977). See also Crane Co. v. American
Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1979) (Crane 3) (Tender offeror held not to have
standing under Rule 10b-5). Following an exhaustive analysis of the Act's legislative history,
430 U.S. at 22-35, the Piper bench, per Chief Justice Burger, concluded that the sole in-
tended beneficiaries of the Williams Act were the shareholders of the target corporation. Id.
at 35. The Piper Court did stress, however, that its holding is to be narrowly construed. Id.
at 42 n.28. Chief Justice Burger asserted, therefore, that the Court was not addressing the
issue whether offerees or the target itself have implied causes of action under the Williams
Act. Id. For a detailed analysis of the implications of Piper see E. ARANow, H. EINHORN &
G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 104-73 (1977).
" See Exchange Act Release No. 16,385 (Dec. 6, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349.
42 The legislative record reveals that all participants and witnesses were aware that the
term referred at least to the conventional tender offer. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra
note 29, at 1-2, 17, 24-25, 42, 48, 61, 62, 87, 104-06, 178, 199, 222-37, 251-57.
43 The issue whether Congress purposefully decided not to define the term has been at
the crux of much of the litigation arising under the Williams Act. See, e.g., Kennecott Cop-
per Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. 584 F.2d 1195, 1206-07 (2d Cir. 1978); Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
4 See Developing Meaning, supra note 3, at 1260-61. It has been argued that because
of the attention given to conventional bids in the Act's history, Congress may have intended
only § 13(d) (post acquisition filing) to cover all transactions other than conventional tender
offers. Id. at 1261. Similarly, other authors question any expansion of the term based upon
what they see as "the plain language of the Williams Act." M. LnTON & E. STEINaERGER,
supra note 3, at 106. In the same light, SEC Chairman Cohen sharply distinguished a tender
from "the ordinary market transaction with which the average investor is familiar." Senate
Hearings, supra note 26, at 17. Although the House Report also depicted the elements of a
conventional tender offer in reciting what a bid "normally consists of," H.R. REP., supra
note 4, at 2, reprinted in U.S. NEWS at 2812, a careful examination of its phraseology reveals
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ported by the addition of section 13(d), whose disclosure require-
ments apply to any type of acquisition program resulting in more
than five percent ownership."5 One might argue, therefore, that if
Congress had intended for the Williams Act to reach beyond con-
ventional offers, it would have so provided in explicit terms. More-
over, Senator Williams explained that in the cases of privately ne-
gotiated transactions and open market purchases, prior disclosure
would be premature and "upsetting [to] the free and open auction
market, where buyer and seller normally do not disclose the extent
of their interest ....
Whatever Congress' intent may have been in passing the Wil-
liams Act, both the SEC and the courts began expanding the scope
of the term tender offer soon after the Act took effect.' 7 An expan-
sive reading of the Act first occured in an SEC release, wherein the
Commission asserted that special bids were to be construed as
tender offers for purposes of the Act.48 Special bids differ from
conventional tender offers in that they are not conditioned upon
the tender of any fixed number of shares, and shareholders there-
fore can sell and not merely relinquish control.'9 Special bids are
similar to cash takeovers, however, in three significant respects.
that use of the word "normally" may well indicate that Congress did not intend such a
restrictive construction.
45 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(1976). Section 13(d) requires persons acquiring more than five
percent of certain classes of securities to file in a'Schedule 13D detailed information with
the SEC within 10 days of the acquisition. Failure to file a timely Schedule 13D can lead to
injunctive relief barring the purchaser from exercising his voting rights. Where the schedule
is filed late but the acquisition of the secruities does not conflict with any of the policies
that prompted passage of the Williams Act, however, injunctive relief has been denied. See
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-61 (1975); General Aircraft Corp. v.
Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 94-95 (1st Cir. 1977).
46 113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams). Interestingly, Senator Wil-
liams distinguished privately negotiated transactions, open market purchases, and tender
offers after acknowledging the contentions of some authorities that all three should be sub-
ject to preacquisition disclosure regulations. Id. Indeed, Congress found the distinctions
drawn by Senator Williams valid. Compare §13(d)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (d)
(1) (1976) with § 14(d)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). The differences are
critical since, if a court finds that the acquirer's activities comprised a tender offer, then the
offeror has already irreparably violated §14(d), whereas a violation of § 13(d) may only re-
sult in a mandatory subsequent filing.
" See generally Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developing Concept of "Tender Offer" An
Analysis Of The Judicial And Administrative Interpretations Of The Term, 23 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 379 (1978); Developing Meaning, supra note 3.
,8 Exchange Act Release No. 8,392 (Aug. 30, 1968).
"' See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597 n.22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974).
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First, special bids are announced on the market tape and therefore
are addressed to all shareholders of a particular class.5 0 Special
bids also feature offering prices that are considerably higher than
those prevailing in the market1.5 Finally, special bids place ceilings
on the numbers of shares sought to be purchased. 2 As a result of
these similarities, a shareholder considering whether to sell securi-
ties pursuant to a special bid is confronted by the same pressures
that inhibit well-reasoned judgment in a conventional tender offer.
It would appear, therefore, that the SEC's extension of the Wil-
liams Act to special bids53 constituted a sound attempt at curbing
the effects of a type of open market purchase program calculated
to bring about a takeover.
Early cases enlarging the definition of "tender offer," although
challenging some traditional conceptions of the nature of privately
negotiated transactions, manifested preventative goals similar to
those of the SEC. In the first case addressing the issue, Cattle-
men's Investment Co. v. Fears,5 4 a federal district court considered
whether the defendant's active and widespread solicitation of the
plaintiff company's stockholders through personal visits, telephone
conversations, and the mails constituted a tender offer.5 5 While ob-
serving that the solicitation methods distinguished the campaign
from conventional takeover bids, which usually are extended to all
shareholders through newspaper advertisements, the court never-
theless held that the transaction was a tender offer. In emphasizing
the manner of solicitation, the court suggested that the means em-
ployed by the defendant were even more calculated to pressure a
shareholder into making an ill-considered investment decision than
would be a newspaper advertisement.5 6 The court took the view
50 NYSE rule 391(c), 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) § 2391. See also Am. Stock Ex. rule 560(d)-
(e), 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) § 9524.
" See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597 n.22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974).
52 Id.
3 The SEC's maneuver may have come in response to a takeover attempt by special
bid only shortly after the Williams Act was implemented. See Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1968, at
7, col. 1. Such a reaction may well have been a warning that the boundaries of the Williams
Act would expand to effect its underlying purpose.
11 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W. D. Okla. 1972), vacated per stipulation, No. 72-152 (W. D.
Okla. May 8, 1972).
56 Id. at 1250-51. Before the court action had commenced, the SEC staff issued a letter
viewing the conduct as a tender offer under the Act. Cattlemen's Inv. Co., [1971-1972 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 78,775, at 81,627 (SEC Staff Letter, Jan. 4, 1972).
5' 343 F. Supp. at 1252.
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that the Williams Act should be construed liberally to effectuate
its remedial purpose, 57 which would be frustrated unless the defen-
dant were required to comply with the disclosure provisions of sec-
tion 14(d).58 It would appear that the Cattlemen court, which con-
strued the term "tender offer" to include a transaction containing
virtually no elements of public solicitation, gave the Williams Act
its broadest interpretation to date. Courts in subsequent cases,
while recognizing that the distinctions between tender offers and
privately negotiated transactions are not always clear,59 have ap-
plied the Act only to transactions conforming more closely to con-
ventional tender offers.60
One approach that apparently has tended to restrict expansion
of the definition of tender offer has been to examine the impact
that a solicitation program has had on the solicited shareholders.
Unlike the Cattlemen test, which focused on the extent of a solici-
tation program, an impact test seeks to weigh the pressures to
which solicitees are subjected."' In the first case that applied the
test, the court reasoned that the Williams Act should govern a
transaction only if the pressure it exerts upon shareholders to sell
is as formidable as would be the pressure accompanying a conven-
tional tender offer.2 Accordingly, if the impact test were applied,
57 Id. at 1251.
58 Id. at 1252. The Cattlemen court ordered that the defendant be enjoined from exer-
cising any power to vote the shares it attained. Id. at 1253.
"I The great weight of authority supports exclusion of pure privately negotiated trans-
actions from the definition of tender offer. See, e.g., E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 74-75 (1973). In support of this proposition, it is con-
tended that the interests of the general investing public would not be prejudiced by this
construction of the Williams Act, since § 13(d)(1) necessitates disclosure of large acquisi-
tions effected in any manner. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS
IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 9 (1977). Additionally, the legislative history, it
is argued, makes vivid distinctions between private transactions and tender offers. See H.R.
REP., supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in U.S. NEws at 2812. Moreover, if private transactions
were found to be tender offers, § 14(d)(5)-(7) would be virtually impossible to apply. See
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978). Fi-
nally, it is asserted that the antifraud provisions, § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, protect those en-
gaging in private negotiations against misrepresentations and omissions. See E. ARANOW, H.
EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra, at 9.
60 See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" See Developing Meaning, supra note 3, at 1256.
62 See Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Tranfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 94,455, at 95,589 (N.D. Ill. 1973). In Nachman Corp., a corporation owning a 30%
interest in the plaintiff, Nachman Corp., instituted a program of over-the-counter, Ex-
change, and private purchases in order to increase its holdings in Nachman. Id. The court
held that private negotiations with 40 shareholders, resulting in purchases from only 14 of
1980]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:520
it would involve an inquiry into the sophistication of the solicited
shareholders, 6  and courts would be able to tailor decisions accord-
ing to the shareholders' needs for information.6 4 It is submitted,
however, that the burden of extensively examining the circum-
stances present in each case generally would make the impact test
difficult to apply in practice. Problems would arise both in plan-
ning a cash takeover and in later assessing whether the takeover
was a tender offer, since the test could be applied only on a case-
by-case basis. Indeed, the shareholder impact test has been criti-
cized as "much too broad, '65 and it appears, therefore, that the
test cannot achieve universal acceptance.
Another approach to defining tender offer, which resembles a
hybrid of the extent and impact tests, arose from an acquisition
program involving both open market and privately negotiated
purchases.6 The offeror started the program by making several
public announcements of his intention to acquire control of the
target company and followed the announcements with rapid accu-
approximately 600 of the company's stockholders, could not be construed to be a tender
offer where the only investors solicited were the company's directors and substantial share-
holders and where the offers were neither firm nor of limited duration. Id. at 95,592. These
offerees "may be presumed to be powerful enough not to be pressured ... into making
uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell." Id. Moreover, the Nachman court believed
that characterizing the defendant's activities as a tender offer would disruptively affect fu-
ture privately negotiated purchases and strike an imbalance between the burdens upon
management and offeror, two results which Congress did not intend. Id.
63 Some commentators have argued that the sophistication of the solicitees should be
considered to determine if a tender offer exists because that guideline parallels one factor
used to determine whether there is a private offering exemption under the 1933 Act. See E.
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 40, at 8. The weight of authority, how-
ever, suggests that if solicitees' sophistication is employed at all, it should not be given great
significance. The major reason submitted for the majority position is that the sophistication
of particular solicitees is not indicative of the impact an offer likely will have on remaining
shareholders. See id. at 8-9; Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions of the Federal
Securities Laws, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 551, 579 (1975).
1, It was correctly observed that the impact test approach would not render § 13(d)
defunct. Developing Meaning, supra note 3, at 1276. Rather, § 14(d) would merely be trig-
gered by a wider variety of circumstances than under a more constrained interpretation. Id.
at 1276.
11 D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 94,771, at 96,559 (S.lb.N.Y. 1974). Despite its criticism of the impact test, the D-Z
court nevertheless applied it and found that the acquisition of approximately 13% of a com-
pany's stock by means of four private transactions and a series of market purchases over a
span of 3 months did not constitute a tender offer. Id. at 96,562.
" See S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978), petition for
reconsideration denied, 466 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Mass. 1979).
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mulations of stock.17 Finding that the preacquisition public an-
nouncements subjected shareholders to the very pressures and
dangers that the Williams Act was designed to relieve, the court
held that a tender offer had occurred."' In reaching its conclusion,
the court apparently employed neither an extent test nor an im-
pact test. Instead, it examined both the extent of the alleged
tender offer and its probable impact on shareholders, utilizing
what might be termed a "widespread public announcement" test."9
While leaving undisturbed the notion that a pure open market
purchase program does not constitute a tender offer, 70 the court
indicated that widespread public announcements preceding open
market purchases would expose such acquistions to the strictures
of the Williams Act. 1
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1125. The court framed the issue of the case as "whether defendants' method
of acquisition of [the plaintiff's] common stock creates the same pressures and dangers, as
in Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, . . . that the Williams Act was designed to pre-
vent." Id. at 1125 (emphasis in original). The court found it significant that the defendant's
purchases followed its issuance of three press releases which had specified the terms of a
proposed tender offer and alternative buying methods. Id. at 1126. The result of such pub-
licity, the S-G court reasoned, was to instill in the minds of the target's shareholders the
very fears which lead to hasty decisions. Id. According to the court, therefore, a tender offer
is made where a pervasive announcement by the purchaser of his intention to acquire con-
trol of the target precedes an actual rapid accumulation by means of market or privately
negotiated purchases. Id. at 1126-27. The S-G court added that the conditional language
employed by the defendant in its proposals did not lessen the need for investor protection,
especially where the announcements were both precise and genuine. Id. Hence, the court
ultimately found that the open market and private transactions probably did amount to a
tender offer. Id. at 1127. See also Applied Digital Data Systems Inc. v. Milgo Electronic
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp.
1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Land Trust [1974-1975 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,585, at 96,046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
69 466 F. Supp. at 1129; see, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 537, A-8 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 1980).
70 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27.
71 Id. It is plausible that courts will apply a rule of integration and find that a con-
certed program of open market purchases immediately preceding a formal tender offer
should be deemed to be part of that tender offer. See Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act,
Public Law 90-439-Growing Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams
Act, 16 How. L.J. 654, 700-01 (1971). Thus far, however, courts have rejected this construc-
tion. See Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973). Since investors who sell in the open
market prior to the announcement of a tender offer are not confronted with the pressures
accompanying a takeover bid, this judicial rejection appears to be in line with both the more
widely accepted notion that pure open market purchases are not tender offers and with the
spirit of the Act itself.
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The State of the Law in the Second Circuit
The failure of the judiciary to evolve a common definition of
tender offer is highlighted by three recent cases decided within the
second circuit. In the first case, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Corp., 2 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
became the only federal appellate court to pass on the question.
The Kennecott plaintiff challenged the legality of the means by
which Curtiss-Wright Corp. acquired its stock, claiming the tactics
amounted to an undisclosed tender offer. 73 Between November
1977 and March 1978, the defendant engaged in a buying cam-
paign that culminated in the purchase of aplroximately ten per-
cent of the stock in Kennecott Copper.7 4 Most of the shares were
obtained through widely publicized open market dealings.7 5 Some
of the other purchases took place on the exchange floor following
off-the-floor solicitations of fifty shareholders, and the remainder
were purchased from approximately twelve institutional holders in
privately negotiated transactions.76 In an opinion written by Judge
Van Graafeiland, the second circuit held that Curtiss-Wright had
not made a tender offer. 77
Initially, the court declared that the transactions effected
through open trading in a public market were outside the statute.
Addressing the transactions that took place off the floor, the court
rejected the shareholder impact test employed by the lower court,
observing that "[t]he Second Circuit has not yet moved this far.,78
In so ruling, Judge Van Graafeiland reasoned that, while liberal
construction of the Act might not preclude effective application of
7-2 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
73 Id. at 1206-07.
7 Id. at 1197-98.
75 Id. at 1206.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 1207.
71 Id. Judge Van Graafeiland relied on D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), discussed at note 65 supra, as
authority for his contention that the second circuit has not yet gone so far as to construe a
method not conventionally perceived to be a tender offer as a tender offer. Id. at 1206-07.
The district court, citing Developing Meaning, supra note 3, had noted that the shareholder
impact test was the broadest definition of tender offer of which it had been aware. 449 F.
Supp. 951, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Applying that test to the activities of Curtiss-Wright's bro-
kers, the district court reasoned that since the potential sellers were only asked if they
wanted to sell their holdings, were not offered a premium price, were not given a deadline
by which to make a decision and, were all sophisticated investors, they were not likely to
have been pressured into irrational decisions to sell. Id. at 962.
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the Act's antifraud provision, "[i]t would also require courts to ap-
ply the withdrawal, pro-rata, and increased price provisions of [the
Act] to ordinary stock purchases, a difficult if not impossible
task."7 9
The tender offer issue next arose in the second circuit in Bras-
can Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd.,80 in which the Southern District
of New York followed the approach taken in Kennecott. Brascan
grew out of the solicitation of a large block of shares from between
thirty and fifty institutional investors by the defendant's broker.
Since the solicitations had not been made by the defendant Edper
Equities (Edper) directly, the plaintiff contended that the broker
had acted as Edper's agent, because of his assistance in Edper's
efforts to acquire control of the plaintiff."1 The court rejected this
argument, finding that the broker's solicitation of selling share-
holders was not made on Edper's behalf.8 2 In so holding, the court
found that the solicitations were conducted according to "conven-
tional methods of privately negotiated block trades"8 and that,
therefore, the transaction would not constitute a tender offer even
if the broker were considered Edper's agent.84 The Brascan court
observed that conventional tender offers were distinguished from
other large scale acquisition programs in the legislative history of
the Williams Act.8 5 Moreover, the court asserted that an exces-
sively liberal application of the Williams Act would make it impos-
71 584 F.2d at 1207; see notes 34-36 supra. Despite the apparent reluctance of the sec-
ond circuit in Kennecott to move far away from the conventional meaning of tender offer,
that decision did not hammer the death knell into a broader construction that might be
given to the term at some future date. Judge Van Graafeiland made this clear when he
noted that "[i]f this court is to opt for an interpretation of 'tender offer' that differs from its
conventional meaning, this is not the case in which to do it." 584 F.2d at 1207.
80 [1979 Tranfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,882, at 95,617 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
81 Id. at 95,631-32.
82 Id. The Brascan court rejected the plaintiff's agency argument because, in its view,
the evidence did not support a finding that the broker was acting pursuant to the instruc-
tions of or on behalf of Edper. Id. Further reasoning that if the broker's solicitations con-
summated in sales, he would have earned handsome brokerage commissions, Judge Leval
concluded that the broker was acting in his own interest, albeit, that interest was shared by
Edper. Id.
83 Id. at 95,631. The court noted that "privately negotiated block trading is done on a
daily basis in the U.S. securities markets without anyone's ever suspecting that what is be-
ing practiced might be a tender offer." Id.
84 Id. Judge Leval thought that the acquisition of large bulks of stock on the open
market through cautious bidding is not a tender offer irrespective of the amount of stock
that is accumulated. Id.
85 Id. at 95,632 (citing 113 Cong. Rec. at 854-56 (remarks of Sen. Williams); Senate
Hearings, supra note 29, at 16, 17, 24-25, 36 (testimony of SEC Chairman Cohen)).
19801
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:520
sible for anyone to engage in a takeover scheme "except in the
manner of a conventional tender offer." 6
The Brascan court also addressed contentions made in a brief
filed by the SEC as amicus curiae.87 Apparently departing from its
prior position, which avoided adopting a definition of a term it
considered to be dynamic in nature,8 the SEC proposed that the
court consider eight factors in determining whether a tender offer
had been made. Examination of these factors suggests that the
SEC was advocating a definition consistent with the more liberal
case law. Initially, the Commission urged, the court should look for
"active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders, ' 8 9
which had figured prominently in the disposition of the Cattlemen
case.90 The next four factors correspond to conventional notions of
what constitutes a tender offer:91 whether the solicitation sought a
substantial percentage of the target's shares, whether a premium
price was offered, whether the terms of the offer were non-negotia-
ble, and whether the offer was conditioned upon the tender of a
stated minimum number of shares.92 Another two factors con-
tended by the SEC to be relevant reflect the shareholder impact
test:93 whether the offer was to remain open for a limited period of
86 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 95,632.
87 Id. at 95,632-33.
88 Adhering to a stance it had taken in a 1976 release, the SEC 3 years later, articulated
the following approach:
In recognition of the dynamic nature of tender offers and the need for the
Williams Act to be interpreted flexibly in a manner consistent with its purposes,
the Commission affirms its position that a definition of the term "tender offer" is
neither appropriate nor necessary at this time .... [T]his position should in no
way be construed to mean that the term applies only to a so-called "conventional"
tender offer ...
Therefore, the determination of whether a transaction or series of transactions
constitutes a tender offer depends upon consideration of the particular facts and
circumstances in light of such purposes.
Exchange Act Release No. 15,548 (Feb. 5, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) V 81,935, at 81,213 (1979); see Exchange Act Release No. 12,676 (Aug. 2, 1976),
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 80,659, at 86,695-96 (1976). Accord-
ing to the Commission, the essential purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that sharehold-
ers have both sufficient time and information to consider whether to tender or retain their
stock. Id.
88 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 95,632.
" See Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1972), va-
cated per stipulation, No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972); notes 54-58 supra.
1 See Developing Meaning, supra note 3, at 1251.
82 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 95,632-33.
9' Id. at 95,633.
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time, and whether the solicitees were pressured into making hasty
decisions." Finally, the SEC argued that the court should be wary
of any public announcements of the offeror's intentions prior to
rapid acquisition of securities, 95 a factor that had been given signif-
icant weight in an earlier case applying a variation of the impact
test.9 6
Although the Brascan court requested the SEC to prepare the
brief, it criticized the Commission for failing to indicate the num-
ber of factors that had to be satisfied for an acquisition to be
treated as a tender offer and it questioned the validity of the broad
interpretation of the Williams Act.97 Accordingly, the court did not
base its decision on the arguments contained in the SEC's brief.98
04 See Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,455, at 95,589-90 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1252
(W.D.Okla. 1972), vacated per stipulation, No. 72-152 (W.D.Okla. May 8, 1972). See also
Welman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
91 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,882 at 95,633.
96 See S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass.
1978).
97 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,882, at 95,632-33.
The Brascan court criticized the SEC interpretation as being both an impermissible and
undesirable reading of the Williams Act. Id. at 95,632. Nevertheless, the court did analyze
Edper's activities in accordance with the Commission's standards, appearing to be mindful,
however, of the Kennecott precedent at all times. Id. at 95,632-33. Judge Leval first noted
that directing solicitations to 50 of 50,000 shareholders did not satisfy the first factor calling
for active and widespread solicitation. Id. at 95,632. Edper's solicitations were made to only
one tenth of 1% of Brascan's shareholders. The Brascan court found the second factor,
solicitation of a substantial percentage of the target's stock, clearly met because a large
percentage of Brascan's stock was, in fact, solicited. Id. at 95,633. Finding that the third and
fifth factors, a premium price and the contingency of a minimum number of shares being
tendered, were met "only to a slight degree," id., and that the remaining elements were
absent, Judge Leval determined that, even under the SEC guidelines, Edper's activites did
not constitute a tender offer. To have found otherwise, the judge remarked, would have
been to usurp legislative power and rewrite the provisions of the Williams Act. Id. Upon a
careful reading, it may be seen that the Brascan court felt compelled, perhaps by the Ken-
necott decision, not to adhere to the SEC factors, thereby disregarding Congress' intent.
underlying the Williams legislation.
At least one commentary has attacked the eight SEC factors as being too vague for
practical application. See Block & Schwarzfeld, How to End 'Confusion' Under the Wil-
liams Act, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1979, at 3, col. 3. Furthermore, they submit that the factors
leave decision making to the subjective whims of presiding judges, id., which results in in-
consistencies and risky planning. See Block & Schwarzfeld, Curbing the Unregulated
Tender Offer, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 133, 153 (1978). Accordingly, the authors originally urged
rulemaking by the Commission in this area. Id. Having subsequently found the Commis-
sion's position to be inadequate, the commentators presently suggest that new legislation
might be more appropriate. Block & Schwarzfeld, How to End 'Confusion' Under the Wil-
liams Act, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1979, at 3, col. 4.
91 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 95,632.
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Although the Kennecott and Brascan decisions suggest that
the courts within the second circuit will limit application of the
Williams Actto conventional tender offers, a more recent decision
has broadly interpreted the Act. In Wellman v. Dickinson,"9 Judge
Carter of the Southern District of New York discussed the Act in
depth and concluded that liberal application of it would effectuate
its purposes best.100 The events culminating in the lawsuits in
Wellman consisted of face-to-face transactions with a small num-
ber of individual shareholders and of telephone solicitation of ap-
proximately thirty institutional holders, which enabled the raider
to acquire a controlling position in the target company.10 1 The
court initially considered whether the transactions were privately
negotiated or public, reasoning that the former could not consti-
tute a tender offer, but that the latter might. 10 2 Noting that similar
:9 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
100 Id. at 822.
1o1 The Welman litigation arose from the rapid acquisition of 34% of Becton, Dickin-
son & Co.(BD) stock, a percentage guaranteed to afford control, by a wholly owned subsidi-
ary formed to buy the shares. Id. at 790. In planning the acquisition program, Sun's advisors
decided that private transactions would be the most favorable strategy in light of a hostile
BD management. Id. at 806; see Frome, District Court Focuses on Definition of Tender
Offer, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1979, at 2, col. 3. Two separate scripts were prepared for telephone
solicitations to individuals and institutions. 475 F. Supp. at 806-07 n.19. Two days before
the phone solicitations were to take place, Fairleigh Dickinson, Jr., his daughter, and a close
friend, all of whom disfavored the current BD management, were approached with an offer.
They were told that Sun was the offeror, that they could choose between two offering prices,
and that everything was to be kept confidential. Id. at 808. The telephone callers were sup-
plied with a list of instructions covering the following points: (1) confidentiality was impera-
tive; (2) the purchaser would remain uncommited unless a minimum of 20% BD stock was
obtained; (3) the minimum was to be revealed to the institutions; (4) the purchaser's iden-
tity was not to be disclosed until the 20% was acquired-the institutions could, however,
have been notified that the purchaser was among Fortune magazine's listing of the nation's
top 50 companies; (5) the only stock to be solicited was that which the institutions had
unfettered discretion to dispose of; (6) the purchase price was negotiable; (7) the callers
were instructed not to require a response quicker than was customary in block trading; and
(8) that the callers were not acting as brokers. Pretrial Brief #1 for Defendants at 33-35.
The solicitations of approximately 30 institutions were made from New York to cities
throughout the nation, with the exception that calls to Massachusetts institutions were
made from offices in Boston. 475 F. Supp. at 809-10. In slight variance with the instructions
given to the callers, most solicitees were told that the $45 non-recourse price was final and
that response within one hour was required. Id. at 810. One and one-half hours after the
solicitation began, the 20% minimum had been attained and Sun's representatives antici-
pated that the total might exceed the desired 34%. Id. Fearful that verbal promises might
be broken, the following day Sun dispatched couriers across the country to acquire physical
possession of the stock. Id. at 810-11.
102 475 F. Supp. at 817. The court observed that the dividing line between private and
public transactions was unclear. Id. See also Heine v. Signal Cos., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,898, at 91,311, 91,320 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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considerations were involved in determining the availability of a
private placement exemption under the Securities Act of 1933,103
the court held that since the solicitees lacked access to information
as would be required for a private placement exemption, 10 4 the
transactions had been public.105 Turning to whether the transac-
tions constituted a tender offer, the court examined the legislative
history of the Williams Act and found that the transactions resem-
bled a conventional tender offer in all relevant respects, 106 from the
acquisition program involving a takeover bid and the premium of-
fering price to the conditional offer to buy. While conceding that
the transactions differed from a conventional tender offer in that
they were accomplished without publicity or use of a depository,
the court found the differences insignificant.10 7 Interestingly, the
103 475 F. Supp. at 818-20; see the Securites Act of 1933, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
The private placement analogy drawn by Judge Carter had previously been made. See Block
& Schwarzfeld, Curbing the Unregulated Tender Offer, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 133, 139 (1978).
The private placement exemption under the Securities Act of 1933 was premised on Con-
gress' belief that there are certain transactions in which "no practical need" for registration
exists and that, in such cases, the benefits to the public would be "too remote." H.R. REP.
No. 93, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1933). It has been suggested that the types of transactions to
which Congress referred were those involving only a few potential investors. Moreover,
where the offerees of unregistered stock are able to fend for themselves by virtue of their
own knowledge, sophistication, or access to relevant data, there is no real benefit in requir-
ing registration. See Block & Schwarzfeld, Curbing The Unregulated Tender Offer, 6 SEC.
REG. L.J. 133, 139 (1978). See generally Newlin, Control Stock: Disposition Without Regis-
tration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 Bus. LAw 773 (1969). The self-protection ap-
proach has, however, been abandoned in some recent judicial decisions. See note 104 infra.
1" 475 F. Supp. at 820; see SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). In Ralston,
the Supreme Court defined the contours of the 1933 Act private offering exemption to in-
clude those offers made to persons who could protect their interests. Id. at 124-25. Subse-
quently, it has been held that the sophistication of an offeree alone does not render a trans-
action private since a high degree of business knowledge is no substitute for access to
information. Indeed, without disclosure, even the most intelligent investor would have no
basis on which to exercise his abilities. See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545
F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d
680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971). Accordingly, Judge Carter gave little weight to the fact that 30 of
the 39 holders solicited by Sun were institutional investors. 475 F. Supp. at 820.
105 Looking to the facts before him, Judge Carter observed that the solicitors were not
authorized to negotiate with the offerees, but rather were instructed to get quick commit-
ments over the telephone based on a mere price quote. Consequently, the court reasoned,
the absence of providing shareholders with adequate information precluded a private trans-
action status. Id. at 821-23.
"08 From its analysis of the Act's legislative history, the Wellman court found that the
essential elements of a conventional tender offer are a bid, a tender by the offerees, a bid-
der's conditional obligation, universal publicity, and the offeror's intent to effect a shift in
corporate control. Id. at 821-22.
107 Id. at 822. Finding that a bid, premium price, conditional obligation, and intent to
shift control were all present, the Wellman court reasoned that the facts before it may well
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SEC filed a brief in the Wellman action similar to the one it had
filed in Brascan.108 In contrast to the Brascan court, which re-
jected the Commission's factors, the Wellman court approved of
the SEC's position' 09 and indicated that the contested action
would constitute a tender offer under this test even if it were not
deemed a conventional tender offer." 0
As a result of the inconsistent interpretations given the Wil-
have constituted a conventional tender offer notwithstanding the absence of widespread
publicity, solicitation of the general body of investors, and use of a depository. Id. at 823.
108 Id. at 822; see notes 87-98 and accompanying text supra.
,09 See 475 F. Supp. at 823-26. In its brief in the Wellman action, the SEC excluded the
element of publicity as a factor to consider in defining tender offers, see text accompanying
notes 95-96 supra, and, hence, confined its test to the seven remaining factors. Id. The court
noted that this was done probably because that feature was unquestionably and purpose-
fully missing from Sun's acquisition program. Id.
110 Id. at 825. Observing that 40% of the target company's shares were held by institu-
tional investors and that this group of shareholders was solicited in a nationwide campaign,
Judge Carter was persuaded that there was "active and widespread solicitation." Id. at 824.
The Welman court found that Congress' rendering the statute effective upon the possibility
of a 5% acquisition was sufficient to establish a quantitative test for the "substantial per-
centage" requirements. Thus, the acquisition of 34% of the stock satisfied the second factor.
Id. Importantly, the substantial percentage requirement is not rendered obsolete by Con-
gress' language. While 5% represents the minimum acquisition which will call the statute
into play, a substantially higher percentage may be sought by methods other than a conven-
tional tender offer which embrace only some of the other SEC factors. Where widespread
solicitation is absent, presuming a raw number test is applied to interpret that factor, the
substantial percentage factor may well be of great significance.
After declaring the premium price element to be present, id., the Wellman court ob-
served that the fourth characteristic, firm terms of the offer and lack of opportunity to
negotiate, was met. Id. The fourth element apparently goes hand in hand with the pressure
factor. Both criteria were met by the facts in Wellman Judge Carter asserted, as the inabil-
ity of the solicitees to negotiate terms was made necessary by the speed element crucial to
the program's success. Offerees were pressured from the terms, from messages by the callers
that the goal was rapidly being reached, and from the 1 hour time limit, which satisfied the
sixth factor, the offer being open for a limited time. Id. at 824-25. In concluding that the
defendants' activities satisfied the SEC test, Judge Carter clearly indicated that the absence
of one element "should be no deterrent to classifying this transaction as a tender offer since
a principal objective of the Williams Act was to prevent secret corporate takeovers." Id.
at 825. Interestingly, the court utilized a two-tiered approach in its analysis. Distinguishing
as a preliminary step between private and public transactions, however, was made seemingly
unnecessary because the SEC criteria were employed. Standing alone, the factors apparently
discern the differences between true privately negotiated transactions and open market
purchases on the one hand, and transactions infected with the same evils as an unregulated
tender offer on the other.
Subsequent to Judge Carter's decision in the bifurcated action, the raider, Sun Com-
pany, settled with both the SEC and with the target, Becton-Dickinson, by agreeing to
divest itself of all the Becton stock it acquired through the contested acquisitions, although
still denying any liability. See SEC v. Sun Co. [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,209, at
96,599 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). For a detailed analysis of the parties' settlement, see SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 534, A-6 (January 2, 1980).
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liams Act by the Kennecott, Brascan, and Wellman courts, at least
two related conflicts may be discerned. First, Kennecott and Well-
man leave unclear the actions that will constitute a private trans-
action.111 Second, whether the coverage of the Williams Act ex-
tends beyond conventional tender offers is an open question,
because the Brascan and Vellman decisions suggest opposite an-
swers.'- 2 It is submitted that the opinions within the second circuit
reflect the problems left unresolved by the Williams Act's drafts-
men and highlight the need to prescribe the term "tender offer."
The SEC Proposals
Acknowledging the inconsistencies in the law, and in an effort
to curtail deliberate evasions of the Williams Act, the SEC has re-
cently defined the term "tender offer" in a proposed amendment
to the rules governing tender offers.1  The proposal 4 provides
two distinct tests; satisfying either would characterize a particular
transaction or series of transactions as a tender offer. 1 5 Under the
first tier,116 an acquisition program is deemed a tender offer if it
involves one or more solicitations of securities within a single class
during a 45-day period, is directed to more than ten persons, and
seeks the acquisition of more than five percent of the class.L17 Each
condition must be satisfied to classify a transaction as a tender of-
Compare Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d
Cir. 1978) with Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
112 Compare Welman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) with Brascan
Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., [1979 Tranfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,882, at
95,632 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). A final dilemma is that any informal stance taken by the SEC is
subject to irregular treatment by the judiciary.
113 See Exchange Act Release No. 16,385 (Dec. 6, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349. Although
the SEC had refused to adopt a definition of tender offer, see note 88 and accompanying
text supra, the Commission had been actively involved in expanding the meaning of the
term, see, e.g., SEC Release No. 8,392 (1968), 33 Fed. Reg. 14,109 (determinations regarding
specific transactions); Memorandum of the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v.
Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.Okla. 1972); SEC v. Sun Co., reported sub nom. Wellman v.
Dickinson 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (enforcement proceedings); Letter from SEC
staff to William Gleeson, Esq. re: Methode Electronics, Inc. (Dec. 29, 1976) (no action
letter).
114 The proposal, Proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(1), if adopted, would amend 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-1 (1979).
44 Fed. Reg. at 70,352 (1979).
Proposed Rule 14d-1(b)(1)(i).
"7 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349-50 (1979). Therefore, an offer made on January 1, would be
viewed together with an offer made on February 1, but not with one extended to sharehold-
ers on March 1, although the latter two would be aggregated for separate consideration.
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fer under the first tier." 8 Since the explicit requirements of this
tier make it rather inflexible, the proposed second tier 19 is stated
in terms sufficiently broad to embrace other schemes that the
Commission believes ought to be subject to the Williams Act. This
more flexible test is satisfied if three conditions are met: the
scheme must take place through "widespread solicitation" of the
target company's shareholders, 120 the shares must be sought at a
premium exceeding the greater of five percent of or two dollars
above the stock's current market price,12' and the offer must be
carried out in a manner that denies offerees a meaningful opportu-
nity to negotiate its terms. 122
The SEC recognizes that under its proposed rule, "certain
open market purchasing programs . . . would be tender offers. 1 23
Because the Commission does not intend the rule to be unlimited
in scope, however, it has provided an exemption for transactions
by brokers and their customers and dealers. 24 In order for a trans-
action to come within this exemption, four conditions must be sat-
isfied: an individual seeking the exemption mist not solicit "any
order to sell;' 2 5 a broker or dealer may engage only in activities
customarily performed by members of his profession; 2 a broker or
dealer must not receive more than a normal commission for his
services; 27 and an offer must seek shares at the current market
price.12 It would appear that this exemption, applicable to trans-
actions that would otherwise satisfy the first tier,29 is tailored to
118 Id.
Proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(1)(ii).




124 Id. at 70,350.
125 Id. The Commission has pointed out that activity by a broker or dealer which
merely amounts to talks with specialists or persons on the exhange floor would not amount
to a solicitation sufficient to remove the transaction from the exception. Id. Where, however,
talks are conducted off the floor or prior arrangements are made merely to conclude the sale
on the floor, the Commission would view such activity as a solicitation. Id. Additionally,
where a block is assembled off the floor or where the offeror publicizes his intent to engage
in a large acquisition program, the Commission also has taken the position that solicitations




129 Because the second tier of the test contemplates only offers made for a premium
above the market price, the exception is applicable only under the first test.
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distinguish true open market purchases from those merely dis-
guised as such by being consummated on the floor of an
exchange. 130
It is submitted that the definition embodied in the proposed
rule reflects both the spirit of the Williams Act and the cases prop-
erly construing it. To be sure, Congress drew distinctions between
privately negotiated and open market transactions and tender of-
fers in debating the merit of the Act and in enacting pre- and post-
acquisition filing requirements s13 but it did not indicate a desire to
limit the tender offer provisions to conventional tender offers.
While it might be argued that Congress intended to exempt pri-
vate transactions of any form from preacquisition regulation, it is
submitted that any such exemption must be limited to private
transactions as they were understood at the time the Act was de-
bated. The provisions of the Act affecting tender offers would carry
little force if they could be sidestepped by labeling solicitations re-
sembling cash takeover bids as private transactions or open market
purchases. The proposed rule appears to scrutinize the distinctions
between pure private transactions and imposters.3 2
The strict numerical test of the first tier of the proposal ap-
pears to be a sound approach toward identifying those transactions
deserving of Williams Act protection. It seems reasonable, for ex-
ample, to aggregate all offers made within any consecutive 45-day
period in order to determine whether other elements of the test
have been satisfied.1 33 Although the Commission offers no rationale
for its selection of a 45-day period, a program of that duration
should give the target's management sufficient time in which to
recognize and deal with any takeover attempt. Furthermore, if a
program of numerous offers lasts for more than 45-days, yet fails
to satisfy the requirements of the first tier within any 45-day pe-
riod, a court would not be precluded from considering whether the
0SO 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,350.
131 See note 46 supra.
Ms See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 817-20; Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. [1980] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,145 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1979); S-G Securities, Inc. v.
Fuqua Inv. Co. 466 F. Supp. 114 (D. Mass. 1978); Nachman Co. v. Halfred Inc. [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,589 (N.D. IlM. 1973); Cattlemen,
343 F. Supp. at 1251-52, vacated per stipulation, No. 72-152 (W.D.Okla. May 8, 1972). But
see Kennecott Copper Corp., 584 F.2d at 1207; Brascan Ltd. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
Sac. L. REP. (CCH), at 95,617.
133 See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,350 n.10 (1979).
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program is nevertheless a tender offer under the second tier.1 4
The first tier also offers a logical resolution of whether a test
conditioned on the number of offerees solicited is preferable to one
conditioned on the percentage of shares solicited. 3 5 Under the ap-
proach taken by the American Law Institute in the proposed Fed-
eral Securities Code, a transaction would be treated as a tender
offer if more than thirty-five persons were solicited and successful
completion of the transaction would result in the purchaser's own-
ing five percent or more of the target company's stock. 36 Thus, a
solicitation of fifty persons, owning in the aggregate only three per-
cent of the target's stock by a person already owning three percent
would be treated as a tender offer, while the solicitation of twenty-
five persons could not be, even if the twenty-five persons held ten
percent of the company's stock.1 7 The SEC's approach should
avoid such an anomaly. Under the first tier, a solicitation must be
directed to more than ten persons and must itself seek more than
five percent of the target's stock. It would appear that in condi-
tioning satisfaction of the first tier test on the number of solicitees
and the percentage of shares sought, the SEC has kept in mind the
considerations underlying passage of the Williams Act-protection
of shareholders with little bargaining power.3 " Thus, for example,
a solicitation of thirty persons collectively owning ten percent of
I" See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
131 The authors of one work contend that the percentage of stockholders solicited is
generally more significant than the number approached. Einhorn & Blackburn, The Devel-
oping Concept of "Tender Offer": An Analysis of the Judicial and Administrative Inter-
pretations of the Term, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 379, 396 n.84 (1978).
136 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 299.9(a) (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974). Other commentators, by
drawing an analogy to the numbers utilized in the private placement exemption under the
1933 Act, have suggested that if 35 shareholders are solicited within a 1-year period, a re-
buttable presumption in favor of the making of a tender offer should arise. See E. ARANOW,
H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 5-
6 (1977). By not establishing criteria necessary to determine what could rebut the presump-
tion, however, its application may be problematical.
"I For purposes of §14(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), see note 39 supra,
a solicitation program of 10% of the shares would be a tender offer irrespective of the per-
centage of stock ultimately owned. Cf. A&K R.R. Mat. Inc. v. Green Bay & Western R.R.,
437 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (target's securities not registered under § 12 and issuers
not subject to periodic reporting requirements of § 15); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l, Inc.,
420 F. Supp. 1166 (D.R.I. 1976) (tender offer in going private transaction); Smith v. New-
port Nat'l Bank 326, F. Supp. 874 (D.R.I. 1971) (tender offer for securities of a national
bank); Butler Aviation Int'l Inc. v. Desyners Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd,
425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970) (§ 14(e) action regarding an exchange offer, then not considered
to be a tender offer under § 14(d)(1)).
"I See note 29 supra.
[Vol. 54:520
DEFINING TENDER OFFERS
the target's stock would be a tender offer and would require disclo-
sure prior to acquisition. In contrast, a solicitation of five persons
collectively owning forty percent of the target's stock would not
constitute a tender offer, which is justified, since the solicitees' in-
terests would be substantial enough that they probably would have
sufficient leverage to insist that the offeror negotiate.
One problem that may arise under the first tier relates to the
Commission's failure to define "person" in the requirement that
the offer must be directed to at least ten persons. Since the pro-
posed rule currently lacks such a definition,139 it is unclear whether
accounts handled by financial institutions and whether parties
having special relationships with one another are to be counted as
one solicitee.140 It is hoped that the Commission, if it should ulti-
mately adopt the proposals, will expressly provide for members of
a tightly knit family to be viewed as a single person under the test.
Under such circumstances, the solicitees have the capability of
uniting to negotiate a pact or defeat the bid.' 4 1
Unlike the first tier of the proposed rule, the second tier con-
tains no specific time period, percentage test, or minimum number
of offerees. Instead, the second tier contemplates widespread solici-
tation, a premium price, and non-negotiable terms, affording the
courts greater leeway than under the first tier. The SEC's concern
over solicitation in a widespread manner may be traced to the Cat-
tlemen and Wellman decisions. In these cases, it was recognized
that solicitations conducted in a manner different from the con-
ventional newspaper advertisement may be more calculated to
force a hurried investment decision.142 In proposing the second
139 Recognizing potential ambiguities, the Commission requested specific comments on
the proper definition of the term "person." 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,350 n.11. One approach is that
the term carry with it the same definition as was given it in § 3(a)(9) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(9) (1976), wherein "person" means a "natural person, company, govern-
ment, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government." Id. Another pos-
sibility is that the term operate so as to count individually all accounts of investment advi-
sors, clients of brokers or dealers, and trusts administered by various banks. See
Preliminary Note 5 to Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1979). Under this method, the solicita-
tion of one financial institution could conceivably satisfy the test.
140 The SEC recognizes that circumstances exist wherein a number of persons should
only be counted once, but is uncertain whether it should expressly provide for such relation-
ships. 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,350 n.11.
141 It is further hoped that if the Commission specifically enumerates instances wherein
several persons should be treated as one, it will clearly establish that any such list is not
exhaustive, in order to allow flexible interpretation of the Williams Act.
142 See notes 56 & 110 and accompanying text supra.
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tier, the SEC apparently has adopted the positions of the Cattle-
men and Wellman courts by expressly urging that interpretations
of the term "widespread" be consistent with these opinions.143 Al-
though the second tier is potentially broad in scope, it will allow
courts to examine the particular circumstances of any offering that
was directed to enough shareholders to raise a question about its
private nature, even though it would not be considered a tender
offer under the first tier. 144 Thus, the second tier seems to offer
courts considerable flexibility in applying the Williams Act, an end
to which the proposed rule is directed.145
One difficulty that may arise under the second tier concerns
the premium price factor. Since that factor is satisfied only if se-
curities are solicited for a price higher than the greater of five per-
cent of or two dollars more than the stock's market price, 146 some
puzzling situations may surface. To demonstrate, the condition is
satisfied for stock having a five dollar per share market value at an
offering price of seven and one-eighth, which amounts to a pre-
113 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,351. According to the SEC, widespread solicitation may be
brought about in a variety of ways, ranging from the traditional newspaper announcements
or press releases to more recently recognized methods of telephone solicitations, use of the
mails, or personal visits to shareholders. 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,351 n.16. The SEC further sup-
ports the interpretation given to the notion of widespread solicitation by the court in Hoo-
ver Co. v. Fuqua Indus. Inc. [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,145 (N.D. Ohio
1979). In Hoover, the court was confronted with an offer made to more than 100 holders of
Hoover Co. stock, each of whom were descended from the company's founders. Id. at 96,146.
Applying the SEC factors, see notes 87-96 and accompanying text supra, the court observed
that since there was great diversification among the family members, their solicitation was
no different from a solicitation of all the target's shareholders. Hence, the first SEC factor,
widespread solicitation, was found to have been met. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) at 96,148-49. See also Block & Schwarzfeld How to End Confusion Under the
Williams Act, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1979, at 3, cols. 5-6 n.40. Emphasizing the widespread solici-
tation and the pressure upon shareholders that accompanied it, the Hoover court found that
a tender offer had been made. [1980] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 96,150.
Commentators have suggested that one flaw in the proposals might stem from uncer-
tainty over the meaning of the term "widespread solicitation." See Hein, Lesser & Reich,
New Tender Rules: Detailed and Broad Ranging, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1979, at 41, col. 1. The
authors, however, appear to be confusing the definition of "widespread solicitation," a term
that has been consistently expanded by the courts, with the term's acceptance by the judici-
ary as a factor to consider in defining tender offer, which has not been universal. Compare
Wellman, 475 F. Supp. 783 with Brascan Ltd. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP.
(CCH) 96,882.
14 Cf. A. ARANOw, E. EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 40 at 9-10 (opting for ex-
amination into facts of each case).
44 Fed. Reg. at 70,349.
Id. at 70,351.
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mium of forty percent. 147 An offer for any lower price would not
satisfy the test because the two-dollar minimum premium would
be applicable in any instance in which the stock's market price is
less than $40 per share.1"8 In contrast, the condition is satisfied for
stock having a market value of $100 per share at an offering price
of $106, which amounts to a premium of only six percent. There
seems to be little doubt that an investor is more likely to react
hastily to the former offer than the latter. Given the importance
that the courts, 4 9 commentators, 150 and Congress 51 have attached
to the premium price element, it is suggested that the SEC recon-
sider this aspect of the second tier. Unless corporations with low
priced stock become generally unattractive to corporate raiders,
the SEC is advised to redefine the premium price element so as to
make it solely dependent upon a percentage excess of the offering
price over the market price.
The final factor of the second tier, the lack of a meaningful
opportunity for offerees to negotiate, is perhaps the most critical
for distinguishing a privately negotiated transaction from a tender
offer. Parties who truly intend their dealings to be private must be
afforded opportunities to negotiate. 152 Moreover, as the degree of
negotiating leverage decreases, the need for the protections guar-
anteed by the Williams Act increases, particularly in a transaction
in which time is a crucial factor.
Despite a few aspects that may be problematical, the Commis-
sion's proposals appear workable and "capable of providing gui-
dance and certainty to practitioners and their clients,"' 5' without
being "unduly burdensome to the prospective bidders."'15 4 Further-
more, the SEC's definition seems consonant with Congress' pur-
11 The current market price refers to the higher of the last sale price or the highest
independent bid. Id. at 70,350 n.14.
"4 At $41 per share, 5% would be $2.05 and any bid, therefore, would have to exceed
$43.05 to be considered a tender offer under the second test.
49 See note 107 supra.
150 See, e.g., Developing Meaning, supra note 3, at 1251.
151 See note 42 supra.
152 One commentator observed that "[iln negotiated purchases from a few, substantial
shareholders, pressure is. . . absent since these shareholders have the leverage to obtain the
disclosure, time, and fair treatment necessary to make an informed, carefully considered
decision on whether to sell their controlling interest." Developing Meaning, supra note 3, at
1276 n.137.
11: 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,352.
154 Id.
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pose in passing the Williams Act,155 without overstepping the
boundaries drawn by the case law. While the reach of the SEC's
proposed definition goes beyond the strict "conventional tender of-
fer only" view elucidated by the Kennecott and Brascan courts, it
successfully ties together the valid arguments forwarded by advo-
cates of the "extent" and "impact" tests. In so doing, the proposal
reflects the reasoning advanced by the Cattlemen and Wellman
benches and their progeny. It is hoped, therefore, that adoption of
the amendments will resolve the inconsistency which has devel-
oped in the case law.156
CONCLUSION
It cannot be doubted that regulation of tender offers is essen-
tial to prevent a recurrence of the dangers and abuses that were
155 It has been asserted that the SEC's proposals may be broader in scope than the
meaning Congress intended tender offer to have and may therefore be both unauthorized
and unconstitutional. Hein, Lesser & Reich, New Tender Rules: Detailed & Broad Ranging,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1979, at 41, col. 1; accord, Fogelson, Friedman & Wenig, SEC's Proposed
Amendments to Williams Act, N.Y.L.J., March 14, 1980, at 4, col. 6. One commentator has
further argued that the position taken by the Commission in its proposals is even broader
than that which the SEC opted for when it urged several courts to consider the "eight fac-
tors." Frome, Expanded Definition of Tender Offer, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 29, 1980, at 2, col. 3. In
support of this allegation, it was observed that the second tier of the SEC's definition could
be satisfied if only three of the eight factors are present. Id. at col. 4. Moreover, it was
asserted:
It is hard to imagine ... an offer which is made at current market price and on
negotiable terms, which is for an unlimited number of shares and is open for an
unlimited period of time, and which is absent any attendant pressure on share-
holders or any public announcements of purchasing programs that can still be said
to compel any investor, even a relatively unsophisticated investor, to make a hur-
ried, uninformed investment decision. And yet, under Proposed Rule 14d-l(b)'s
first tier test such an offer could easily qualify as a tender offer.
Id.
16 The SEC ultimately desires even stricter regulation of corporate takeovers than
could be accomplished through the adoption of its proposed tender offer definition. See
Crock, SEC Seeks Takeover Rule Changes to End Controversy, Could Increase Firms'
Costs, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1980, at 2, col. 3. At the requests of three interested Senate
committees, the SEC has prepared several legislative proposals which, if acted upon by Con-
gress, could "end some of the controversy swirling around many takeover attempts." Id.
Included within these proposals lurks yet another definition of tender offer which is broader
in scope than any of the previously suggested approaches. The Commission's proposal would
deem any transaction wherein the offeror acquires more than 10% of the target's stock to be
a tender offer, with the exception that privately negotiated purchases from 10 or fewer solic-
itees would not be included in the computations. Id. The Commission's proposed amend-
ments to the Williams Act are reprinted in full at 542 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) (Special
Supp.) 2-29, Feb. 27, 1980. See also Fogelson, Friedman & Wenig, SEC's Proposed Amend-
ments to Williams Act, N.Y.L.J., March 14, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
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manifested throughout the era of unregulated tender offers. While
Congress' immediate response to this dilemma, the Williams Act,
was a commendable effort at promoting investor protection, it had
its shortcomings. Although Congress' failure to define tender offer
may have been deliberate, courts construing the Act have been
battling with the omission since the Act took effect and have been
reaching inconsistent results. Despite the SEC's prior refusal to de-
fine tender offer in its implementing rule, the Commission has re-
cently proposed an amendment to determine whether stock acqui-
sitions have been effected by tender offers. Its position generally
reflects the liberal position adopted by some courts. Despite some
potential problems concerning the definition's applicability, the
criteria embodied in the proposal should remove any uncertainties
that presently exist. Moreover, the rule would bring within the
purview of the Williams Act individuals who presently go unpro-
tected because of restrictive interpretations of the Act. Above all,
it is urged that the SEC's factors be applied flexibly so as to realize
the balance Congress attempted to strike between the offeror,
management, and the investor.
Neal I. Korval
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